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Impact of financial incentives on alcohol
intervention delivery in primary care: a
mixed-methods study
Amy O’Donnell1*, Catherine Haighton1,2, David Chappel3, Colin Shevills4 and Eileen Kaner1
Abstract
Background: Local and national financial incentives were introduced in England between 2008 and 2015 to
encourage screening and brief alcohol intervention delivery in primary care. We used routine Read Code data and
interviews with General Practitioners (GPs) to assess their impact.
Methods: A sequential explanatory mixed-methods study was conducted in 16 general practices representing
106,700 patients and 99 GPs across two areas in Northern England. Data were extracted on screening and brief
alcohol intervention delivery for 2010-11 and rates were calculated by practice incentive status. Semi-structured
interviews with 14 GPs explored which factors influence intervention delivery and recording in routine
consultations.
Results: Screening and brief alcohol intervention rates were higher in financially incentivised compared to non-
incentivised practices. However absolute rates were low across all practices. Rates of short screening test
administration ranged from 0.05% (95% CI: 0.03-0.08) in non-incentivised practices to 3.92% (95% CI: 3.70-4.14) in
nationally incentivised practices. For the full AUDIT, rates were also highest in nationally incentivised practices
(3.68%, 95% CI: 3.47-3.90) and lowest in non-incentivised practices (0.17%, 95% CI: 0.13-0.22). Delivery of alcohol
interventions was highest in practices signed up to the national incentive scheme (9.23%, 95% CI: 8.91-9.57) and
lowest in non-incentivised practices (4.73%, 95% CI: 4.50-4.96). GP Interviews highlighted a range of influences on
alcohol intervention delivery and subsequent recording including: the hierarchy of different financial incentive
schemes; mixed belief in the efficacy of alcohol interventions; the difficulty of codifying complex conditions; and
GPs’ beliefs about patient-centred practice.
Conclusions: Financial incentives have had some success in encouraging screening and brief alcohol interventions
in England, but levels of recorded activity remain low. To improve performance, future policies must prioritise
alcohol prevention work within the quality and outcomes framework, and address the values, attitudes and beliefs
that shape how GPs’ provide care.
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Background
Heavy drinking affects one in four adult primary care
patients in the United Kingdom (UK), [1] contributes to
61 disease conditions, [2] and results in a £3.5 billion an-
nual cost to the National Health Service (NHS). [3] Yet
it is one of the most important modifiable causes of pre-
mature morbidity and mortality. [4] There is strong evi-
dence of effectiveness supporting screening and brief
alcohol interventions at reducing consumption, [5] but
historically there have been low rates of delivery. [6]
Voluntary financial incentives were employed between
1st April 2008 and 31st March 2015 to encourage English
general practitioners (GPs) to screen their patients for
heavy drinking using a validated self-report question-
naire [7], and deliver brief behavioural interventions to
those in need of support. [8]
Under the national alcohol-related risk reduction di-
rected enhanced service (DES) scheme, participating
practices were paid £2.38 for each newly registered adult
patient recorded as being screened for heavy drinking.
[9] Whilst the scheme did not directly remunerate inter-
vention delivery, contractual and audit guidance made
clear that those patients identified as drinking at hazard-
ous or harmful levels should be offered a brief or
extended intervention. Locally-negotiated enhanced
service (LES) schemes for alcohol were also introduced
in certain areas. LES schemes varied in their scope and
reimbursement rates, although generally they were more
generous than their national counterparts and involved a
more opportunistic approach to screening. For example,
in one area of Northern England, practices received
£8.00 for each registered patient aged 16+ (excluding
newly registered patients covered via the DES) who
screened positive for risky drinking and received brief
advice. Both national and local schemes were voluntary,
and separate to the Quality and Outcomes Framework
(QOF), the principal UK incentive scheme, which links
up to 25% [10] of GPs’ income to performance against a
series of clinical and organisational priority areas [11].
Currently, the QOF does not include specific payments
for alcohol interventions, although GPs are expected to
record alcohol consumption in some disease manage-
ment areas such as hypertension, coronary heart disease
and mental health.
Financial incentives have been used to stimulate im-
provements in healthcare quality in the UK and other
parts of the world. [12] Yet the extent to which this ap-
proach has been effective remains contested, [13] with
concerns voiced over the perverse and unintended con-
sequences of structuring a health system around targets
and process. [14–16] In theory, routine data provide a
timely, cost-effective and comprehensive information
source to support evaluation of incentive schemes. [17]
However, evidence highlights their low sensitivity in
capturing the management and treatment of complex
and chronic conditions. [18] Moreover, even where such
data suggest improvements in health-related outcomes,
a common criticism of pay-for-performance pro-
grammes is that they merely promote better recording
of care rather than better care itself. [19] At the extreme
end of the scale, there have also been accusations of GPs
‘gaming’ the system, by manipulating recording of care
to boost financial reward. [20]
There has been limited research into the impact of fi-
nancial incentives on alcohol prevention work in Eng-
land. [21] The primary aim of our study was to assess
the impact of two specific national and local pay-for-
performance schemes to encourage screening and brief
alcohol intervention delivery using routinely recorded
Read Code data. Given the use of routine data as a proxy
measure of care under such incentive schemes, our sec-
ondary aim was to examine the value of such data from
the GP perspective.
Method
A sequential, mixed-methods study was conducted be-
tween February 2010 and May 2013. First, we sought to
assess the impact of financial incentives on screening
and brief alcohol interventions by comparing recorded
rates of delivery between those practices receiving finan-
cial incentives for alcohol screening and those not re-
ceiving additional payments. Second, we used semi-
structured interviews to explore GPs’ perceptions of fac-
tors influencing the delivery and recording of alcohol in-
terventions in routine consultations.
Quantitative analyses
Data and measures
Read Code data were extracted from a sample of 16 gen-
eral practices based in Northern England. Read Codes
are a standard clinical vocabulary which support encod-
ing of multiple patient events in the UK, including:
demographic details; clinical symptoms and diagnoses;
and laboratory tests and results. [22] Whilst their princi-
pal role is to support clinical practice, Read Codes are
also used to evidence the extent to which GPs have met
their administrative, legal, and contractual obligations,
including those required by financial incentive schemes.
[23]
Read Code search strategies were developed for EMIS
[24] and SystmOne [25] clinical computing systems,
drawing on guidance on the recording of incentivised
screening and brief alcohol intervention activity. [26]
The key coding outcomes of interest were: [1] adminis-
tration of an alcohol screening test (four item FAST
[27]; three item AUDIT-C [28]; ten item AUDIT ques-
tionnaire [7]); and [2] delivery of either brief alcohol ad-
vice (sometimes coded as a brief intervention), or an
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extended brief intervention (which could include add-
itional sessions or longer input). [29] Given the discrete
populations covered by each enhanced service scheme
(only patients registered during the previous 12 month
period were eligible for DES payments, whereas the LES
explicitly excluded this group), we extracted aggregated
counts of each coding outcome of interest from the total
eligible adult population as opposed to newly registered
patients only. This approach also served to protect pa-
tient confidentiality in smaller practices. Full details of
the search strategies are available from the authors.
Data and sample
Stratified purposive sampling was used to identify prac-
tices based on three variables: NHS area (either area A
or B); incentive status (DES only; DES + LES; none); and
practice size. In addition to allowing the comparison of
incentivised versus non-incentivised delivery rates, this
allowed us to compare recorded activity in an area in
which a LES had been launched in addition to the DES
(area B); and one where only the DES was available (area
A). Practice managers were emailed an invitation to par-
ticipate in the study, which explained the purpose of the
research, and what their involvement would entail. A
confidentiality agreement was signed between participat-
ing practices and the research team. Recruitment took
place between March 2011 and April 2013.
Analysis
Screening and brief alcohol intervention rates were cal-
culated by dividing the aggregated Read Code counts by
the total eligible registered adult patient population for
each practice. As indicated above, we used the total
adult population as opposed to newly registered patients
only as our denominator when extracting data and con-
ducting primary analyses. Taking into account the tar-
geted remit of the DES scheme however, we also
estimated the rate of short alcohol screening test admin-
istration amongst newly registered patients only. Rates
for each coding outcome of interest were grouped by in-
centive status (DES only; DES + LES; none). 95% confi-
dence intervals were determined with the binomial
distribution and calculated using the Wilson Score
method [30].
Qualitative analyses
Data and sample
Next, we interviewed 14 GPs to explore their views on
delivering and recording screening and alcohol interven-
tion activity. A purposeful sampling strategy was
employed to identify a maximum variety of participants
based on four criteria: NHS area; incentive status; gen-
der; and employment (salaried or practice partner). We
interviewed GPs from the quantitative sample practices
above, and additional participants whose practice data
had not been assessed, in case the former scrutiny af-
fected their responses. [31] GPs were contacted via
telephone or email, at which point the confidential
and anonymous nature of the study was emphasised,
and written informed consent obtained. Interviews
took place at a time and location convenient to the
participant, generally at their practice. A topic guide
was used to focus discussions on experiences of
delivering and recording alcohol-related care (see
Additional file 1), however emergent issues were also
pursued. Interviews lasted 22-47 minutes (mean = 32
minutes) and were conducted until data saturation
occurred.
Analysis
Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim
and anonymised. Analysis was guided using the
Framework approach, [32] whereby data were sifted,
coded and charted against a coding framework in ac-
cordance with initial and emergent themes. NVivo
Qualitative Research software (version 9.2) was used
for data management and analysis. [33] All interviews
were conducted and analysed initially by AO, with
emergent themes discussed and refined within the
wider research team.
Mixed methods synthesis
Mixed methods data integration took place at two levels.
Results from the quantitative phase informed the con-
tent and direction of the interviews with GPs, as well as
the identification of interviewees. Findings from both re-
search phases were then drawn together to determine
common themes across the study as a whole. As part of
this process, a mixed-methods matrix was employed to
support cross-case analysis of results from nine practices
where both qualitative and quantitative data were avail-
able. [34] This allowed the identification of overarching
themes as well as helping to highlight areas of diver-
gence and discrepancy.
Results
Quantitative results
Data were collected in 16 practices, representing
106,700 patients and 99 GPs in Northern England. Five
practices were signed up to the DES, seven to the DES +
LES, and four had no incentive scheme. Areas A and B
were located adjacently within the same region and were
broadly similar in terms of demography and deprivation.
The key difference between the two areas concerned the
additional local incentive (LES) available to practices in
area B. As take-up of both the LES and the national DES
achieved saturation during 2010-11 in area B, we were
unable to recruit non-incentivised practices to the study
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from that part of the region. Additional practice charac-
teristics are detailed in Table 1, with all data summarised
in Table 2.
Screening for an alcohol use disorder
Rates of short screening test administration (FAST or
AUDIT-C) were lowest in practices with no enhanced
service (0.05% (17/33539), 95% CI: 0.03-0.08). Rates
were higher in practices signed up to either both the
LES + DES (3.56% (1574/44202), 95% CI: 3.39-3.74) or
the DES only (3.92% (1138/29065), 95% CI: 3.70-
4.14). Taken as a proportion of newly registered pa-
tients only, rates were also lowest in non-incentivised
practices (0.63% (17/2680), 95% CI: 0.40-1.01), com-
pared to either practices signed up to the DES only
(47.54% (1138/2394), 95% CI: 45.54-49.54) or those
signed up to both the LES and DES (47.91% (1574/
3285), 95% CI: 46.21-49.62).
For the full AUDIT, practices not signed up to an
enhanced service had the lowest recorded rates of de-
livery (0.17% (57/33539), 95% CI: 0.13-0.22). Those
signed up to both DES + LES services had slightly
lower recorded rates (3.44% (1521/44202), 95% CI:
3.28-3.62) in comparison to practices signed up to
only the DES (3.68% (1069/29065), 95% CI: 3.47-
3.90).
Alcohol intervention
When all instances of recorded alcohol interventions
were combined (brief advice, brief intervention and
extended intervention), rates were highest in practices
signed up to one or more enhanced service for alco-
hol. Combined intervention activity was highest in
practices signed up to either the DES only (9.23%
(2684/29065), 95% CI: 8.91-9.57) or both the DES +
LES (8.32% (3677/44202), 95% CI: 8.06-8.58). Rates
were lowest in practices not signed up to either en-
hanced service (4.73% (1585/33539), 95% CI: 4.50-
4.96).
Qualitative results
Ten of the 14 GP interviewees were based in practices
that participated in the quantitative phase of the re-
search. An equal representation of practices from each
NHS area was achieved. Further participant details are
provided in Table 3, with overarching interview themes,
including where key differences emerged between GPs
working in incentivised versus non-incentivised prac-
tices, described below.
The hierarchy of incentive schemes
All GPs across our sample prioritised the delivery and
recording of QOF-related activity above that for other
Table 1 Key characteristics of sample practices
Enhanced Service for Alcohol Status Size of Practice Index of Multiple Deprivation
ID No Enhanced Service DES only DES + LES Number of registered patients* No. GPs Quintile (1st =most)
Area A P01 1 0 0 1,400 5 1st
P02 1 0 0 16,500 13 2nd
P03 1 0 0 7,600 8 4th
P04 1 0 0 8,000 6 1st
P05 0 1 0 9,800 10 3rd
P06 0 1 0 3,000 2 2nd
P07 0 1 0 6,800 7 3rd
P08 0 1 0 600 3 1st
P09 0 1 0 8,800 7 4th
Area B P10 0 0 1 4,900 4 1st
P11 0 0 1 1,200 4 1st
P12 0 0 1 3,100 4 1st
P13 0 0 1 4,800 4 1st
P14 0 0 1 6,200 5 2nd
P15 0 0 1 7,500 5 1st
P16 0 0 1 16,500 12 3rd
TOTALS 4 5 7 106,700 99 -
* All registered adult patients; totals rounded to nearest 100 to preserve practice anonymity
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incentive schemes, and this hierarchy was reinforced
via administrative and computing systems primarily
designed to support the collection of QOF data. For
GPs based in practices signed up to an alcohol en-
hanced service, as payment was based on the number
of screening tests completed, the administration and
recording of any subsequent preventative activity,
such as the delivery of a brief intervention for alco-
hol, was less systematic. Moreover, screening activity
was typically devolved to nurses and healthcare assis-
tants as part of standard annual health checks or new
patient registrations. GPs reported being unlikely to
formally screen patients for heavy drinking during a
consultation.
Table 3 Summary characteristics of qualitative interview participants
N [14]
Gender Male 7
Female 7
Experience in practice >5 years 4
5-15 years 3
>15 years 7
Employment status Partner 7
Salaried GP 6
Registrar 1
Location Area A 7
Area B 7
Enhanced service status No Enhanced Service 3
Directed Enhanced Service 4
Directed Enhanced Service & Local Enhanced Service 7
Table 2 Recorded delivery of screening and brief alcohol intervention by practice
Enhanced
service
status
Practice All patients*
(newly registered
only)
FAST/ AUDIT-C
screening test
(%)
FAST/ AUDIT-C screening
test (newly registered
show patients only) (%)
Full AUDIT
screening
test (%)
Any form
of alcohol
intervention (%)
Area A No enhanced service P01 1400 (720) 1.09 2.08 0.00 0.00
P02 16500 (1190) 0.01 0.17 0.35 0.44
P03 7600 (330) 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.41
P04 8000 (440) 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.89
ALL 32100 (2680) 0.05 0.63 0.17 4.73
DES only P05 9800 (530) 0.00 0.00 0.31 5.63
P06 3000 (180) 4.98 86.52 0.00 0.00
P07 6800 (440) 0.01 0.23 0.00 0.01
P08 600 (360) 56.21 92.29 5.20 7.89
P09 8800 (880) 7.37 73.47 11.46 23.69
ALL 29000 (2390) 3.92 47.54 3.68 9.23
Area B DES + LES P10 4900 (480) 7.06 72.18 0.00 23.82
P11 1200 (350) 29.67 103.11 0.81 17.97
P12 3100 (590) 15.51 80.00 0.73 9.45
P13 4800 (350) 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.58
P14 6200 (250) 4.14 104.02 0.00 0.37
P15 7500 (500) 1.60 23.73 1.23 6.78
P16 16500 (760) 0.10 2.11 8.50 6.14
ALL 44200 (3280) 3.56 47.91 3.44 8.32
*All registered adult patients; totals rounded to nearest 100 [10] to preserve practice anonymity
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“…you’re driven by what’s important or what you have
to categorise. Somebody smoking is QOF-related so I
find a way to Read Code somebody’s smoking status…
So if you were saying would I record ‘Delivered brief
intervention on alcohol’, I wouldn’t. Unless there was
QOF driven reason for it, or it was important to put in
their notes…”
GP11, male, DES +DES
“We have better systems in the practice to make sure
that the QOF data is collected and there are more
reminders on the screen if it’s not done. Back office
staff will chase people up and things like that.”
GP2, male, DES
Belief in the efficacy of screening and alcohol interventions
Irrespective of practice incentive status, most GPs be-
lieved that alcohol interventions could be effective in
certain contexts, and with certain patients. However,
there were also situations in which such an approach
was viewed as unlikely to be impactful. Only one partici-
pant expressed an unreservedly positive view on their
effectiveness. For some interviewees, this lack of faith in
the effectiveness of brief alcohol interventions related to
a belief that a patient needed to be ‘ready to change’ for
interventions to work. As such, many GPs restricted
their delivery (and in turn, recording) of alcohol inter-
ventions to patients that they judged as being ‘ready to
change’.
“I suppose one of the key things I feel with alcohol to
some extent is, I suppose people have to be wanting to
change before you can take them too far down the
road of an intervention. And so sometimes yes they
know they’re drinking too much but they’re not that
ready to change, so going through a whole pathway
doesn’t always help.”
GP2, male, DES
“You can feel like you’ve had a very good
consultation and they’ll still go on drinking. Or you
can do something really quickly and say ‘You know
for heaven’s sake you’ve got to stop drinking.’ And
they’ll come back in three months and say ‘Do you
know when you said that I was really shocked, I’ve
stopped drinking.’ And you think ‘Oh my goodness!’
It’s very hard to predict who you’re going to have
an effect on.”
GP3, female, no enhanced service
“I’m realistic, it doesn’t work every time… that’s one of
the mysteries, you don’t quite know who it’s gonna
work with, or when it’s gonna work.”
GP7, male, DES + LES
The challenge of coding complex and sensitive conditions
Given the critical role of Read Code data in evidencing
performance for payment purposes, and supporting con-
tinuity of care, most GPs were anxious to code clin-
ical activities correctly. However even in incentivised
practices, there was low awareness of the appropriate
Read Codes for screening and brief alcohol interven-
tions, an issue potentially exacerbated by the exist-
ence of over 280 possible alcohol-related codes. [35]
Further, many interviewees questioned the applicabil-
ity of the available Read Code vocabulary to complex
health conditions or behaviours that were less easily
quantifiable, and thus codified. A few participants
also highlighted the adverse consequences for pa-
tients potentially arising from formally recording
their alcohol status, both in terms of financial im-
pacts (e.g. higher health insurance costs), and the
wider stigma associated with substance use disorders.
When in doubt, some GPs reported using free text
to record such issues rather than formal Read Cod-
ing. Indeed, irrespective of incentive scheme, it ap-
peared that care delivery and care recording were
not always tightly aligned.
“Because, you know the situation is usually so
complex, in terms of the person’s own personal and
social history and what’s led them to heavy drinking…
Read coding, simple coding can’t capture all that sort
of, not by a long shot…you could perfectly well have
instances in which the codes tell you that the doctor or
the nurse has done the right things in terms of an
intervention. But actually if the relationship and the
trust and the understanding of the person’s social
context isn’t there, then you don’t know the whole
story.”
GP6, male, no enhanced service
“I always struggle to find any Read Codes for
alcohol…I wouldn’t use specific Read Codes for an
intervention delivered, I would record more what I
say I did in free-text…I haven’t found so far any
benefit from using codes…if you want to say a
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number of units a week then you’d really have tie a
patient down…and somebody says oh I had three
glasses of wine and a whiskey, tonight, somebody
might classify that as four units but in reality it’s
more nearer seven isn’t it? So if somebody was say-
ing I drink that every night, seven times seven is 49,
and then seven times four is 28, so you can say I
see your alcohol consumption used to be 49 and
now it’s 28, and it could just be the inaccuracies of
data collection. So for me I don’t want to tie some-
thing down…because you could draw false inferences
from data that isn’t that accurate.”
GP11, male, DES + LES
The role of the GP within the patient-centred consultation
All GPs expressed an overriding concern to deliver a
patient-centred consultation, informed by a thorough
understanding of their wider social and familial circum-
stances. Whilst interviewees acknowledged the import-
ance of recording treatment to support continuity of
care, most saw Read Code data of limited value in terms
of documenting a patient’s wider circumstances. This
was seen as a particular weakness when it came to re-
cording alcohol intervention delivery. In contrast, Read
Codes were viewed as a more appropriate means of cap-
turing the nurse-led activities that supported the GP
role, particularly alcohol screening test administration.
“I think often people in government, administrative
bodies they say why aren’t we doing more about
alcoholism in the UK forget that when patients come
to the doctors it’s not a hole in the wall situation…
doctors aren’t automatons and each patient is an
individual.”
GP12, female, DES + LES
“I don’t like codes; you know…I’m a clinician, I love
the clinical encounter… the commitment [is] to what
has gone on with the patient.”
GP7, male, DES + LES
“As long as I know somebody’s drinking 50 units and I
know that I’ve talked them through it and I know that
they’re coming back to see me about it, whether I’ve
coded it on the system or not, so what? The
intervention’s been done.”
GP5, female, DES
Discussion
The introduction of financial incentives in England ap-
pears to have had some success in encouraging primary
care providers to identify and support patients to reduce
heavy alcohol consumption. However, whilst rates of
screening and brief alcohol intervention delivery were
higher in incentivised practices, this trend needs to be
set against very low levels of recorded activity overall.
Since the national DES incentivised the screening of
newly registered patients only, a relatively small group
within the wider patient population, such low rates may
be expected. Our estimated rates of short screening test
administration amongst newly registered patients indi-
cate a more sizeable reach for the national enhanced ser-
vice scheme. However it must be emphasised that these
rates are estimates only: as the 100% + rates achieved by
two of our practices indicate, alcohol screening tests
were conducted with both new as well as existing regis-
tered patients.
Previous research by Purshouse et al suggests that if
such a screening programme is implemented effectively,
it would achieve around 40% coverage of the registered
adult population over a ten year period, leading to re-
duced health service costs and increased health benefits
[36]. However, this scenario is based on an assumption
that a brief intervention for alcohol is delivered immedi-
ately after a patient screens positive for risky alcohol
consumption. In many of our practices, there seemed to
be a mismatch between screening patients for heavy
drinking, and the delivery of subsequent advice or coun-
selling about alcohol. Available prevalence data would
suggest that approximately one in four patients [37] are
likely to be drinking excessively, meaning that one might
expect that at least a quarter of all patients screened
would have received an alcohol intervention. In reality,
for some practices, intervention delivery rates appeared
much lower than expected. Yet, in others, the rates were
much higher when compared with the proportion actu-
ally screened. We could not determine if this was due to
an absence of coding or a lack of follow through to ad-
vice or counselling. We were not told of any deliberately
erroneous or ‘over-coding’ by GPs incentivised for en-
hanced performance. However our interview findings
suggest that additional factors beyond monetary incen-
tives shaped routine practice. In particular, despite con-
sistent evidence to the contrary, [5] many physicians
remain unconvinced of the effectiveness of brief alcohol
interventions: a barrier to delivery raised in previous im-
plementation literature in this field [38].
The strength of our study was the mixed methods de-
sign, which helped provide a rich and nuanced under-
standing of the impact of financial incentives on GPs’
delivery and recording of screening and brief alcohol in-
terventions. By using routinely recorded data as a
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measure of activity, we also provide a valuable insight
into the rates of alcohol prevention work being delivered
in real world as opposed to research trial settings.
However, there are several limitations to our data.
Practices were not randomly sampled and thus there
was a potential for self-selection bias. [39] In the absence
of corroborating observational data (such as consultation
recording), it was only possible to assess activity rates
via formal coding. It is possible that these data were not
an accurate record of all care provided, [40] particularly
given our searches were limited to Read Coded rather
free text data. Moreover, as we extracted aggregated
counts of each variable of interest at practice level, there
is potential for double-counting: that is an individual pa-
tient may have been screened twice with both shorter
and longer tools; or received both brief advice as well as
an extended intervention during the period of interest.
Changes in the Read Codes used to record alcohol inter-
ventions since 2008 make it challenging to compare
trends pre and post the introduction of financial incen-
tives. Thus whilst our study suggests there are significant
differences in delivery rates between incentivised and
non-incentivised practices, these trends cannot be inter-
preted as causal.
The majority of interviewees were drawn from prac-
tices signed up to at least one enhanced service for alco-
hol. Interview accounts may have differed if we had
recruited more ‘non-incentivised’ practitioners, but these
were less inclined to be recruited. Further, whilst overall,
recorded levels of alcohol prevention activity were sig-
nificantly higher in incentivised practices, rates at indi-
vidual practice level were nevertheless low even for
some incentivised practices (P06, P07 and P16), suggest-
ing that our sample captured a range of perspectives. In
addition, despite the central role they appear to play in
delivering alcohol screening tests, we did not interview
nurses in this study. This study sampled 16 practices
and interviewed 14 GPs across two NHS areas in one re-
gion in England, representing approximately eight per
cent of the total practice population. In comparison to
other parts of the UK, Northern England is relatively de-
prived [41] and has higher average alcohol consumption
[42], potentially limiting the generalisability of our data.
Whilst the low delivery rates reported here are unlikely
to be higher elsewhere, a larger study would be required
to validate our findings.
To some extent, our findings support previous re-
search, suggesting that financial incentives can have
positive impacts on screening and brief alcohol interven-
tion delivery in primary care. [21, 43, 44] Interestingly,
our results do not indicate that there was any cumulative
effect for practices that were signed-up to both the local
and national incentive schemes. Given that the GP inter-
views suggested that routine FAST or AUDIT-C delivery
was more likely when embedded within nurse-delivered
practice and associated recording systems (such as regis-
tering a new patient, as incentivised by the DES), limited
instances of opportunistic screening (as incentivised by
the LES) might be expected.
However, the recorded activity rates reported here
were comparatively low for all outcomes of interest, irre-
spective of financial incentive status. Alongside the de-
sign of the scheme, this may be also due to the low level
of remuneration associated with the national DES in
particular. For example, practices participating in the
QOF+ scheme assessed by Hamilton et al, were paid up
to £5,607 for screening and delivering a brief interven-
tion to all eligible patients. [45] DES practices in this
study would have received just £2.38 for each newly reg-
istered patient screened, meaning they would need to
screen around 2,300 patients per annum to achieve simi-
lar financial returns. Our qualitative findings suggest
that differing incentive schemes are not seen as equal by
GPs. Specifically, the QOF has the largest effect on prac-
tice income, so the delivery and recording of enhanced
service activities are often accorded lower priority. [46]
At the same time, a strong theme from our interviews
was the challenge that GPs experience when recording
complex and potentially stigmatising conditions such as
harmful alcohol consumption. In particular, their con-
cern to preserve ‘patient-centred’ consultations some-
times clashed with the need to record simple diagnoses
and outcomes, especially when uncertainty or sensitivity
was at play. [47] This tension has been described as a
“rational-reality gap”, [48] requiring clinicians to main-
tain a “dual orientation” towards coding. [49] Whilst
other research suggests that financial incentives such as
QOF serve to promote an increasingly biomedical
agenda in terms of the management of chronic and
complex health issues in primary care [50], our results
suggest more nuanced behaviour on the part of GPs. Im-
portantly, we found numerous examples of GPs adapting
the system to allow their behaviour to more closely align
with their preferred ‘patient-centred’ approach, with the
‘tick-box’ elements of alcohol-related care devolved to
nurses.
Conclusions
This study provides further evidence that policy initia-
tives that focus solely on the extrinsic motivations of
GPs, such as financial incentives, are unlikely to have
the desired level of impact without acknowledging the
values, attitudes and beliefs that also shape care. The in-
congruity we observed between recorded rates of screen-
ing versus actual alcohol intervention delivery also
highlight the potentially distorting effects of pay-for-
performance on healthcare recording, and in particular,
of incentivising process as opposed to outcomes [51].
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Our findings also suggest that some incentive schemes
are more impactful than others, with QOF unarguably
most influential as far as English primary care is con-
cerned. Given the radical reduction to the number of
clinical indicators covered by the current QOF, [52] the
addition of screening and brief alcohol intervention in
the future seems unlikely. This is despite that the fact
that over one in four patients continue to drink above
recommended levels, [37] whilst three quarters of the
English population do not have any of the diseases listed
in the QOF. [53] Since April 2015, the national en-
hanced service for alcohol has been withdrawn, although
local level incentive schemes remain in place for some
areas [54], and there is now a contractual requirement
for practices to identify newly registered adult patients
drinking above recommended levels [55]. Based on the
findings from this study, which highlight the substantial
challenges experienced by GPs seeking to prioritise non-
incentivised care over their routine management of QOF
conditions, this seems a risky strategy. If NHS England
is to deliver on its promise of “hard-hitting” action on
tackling risky lifestyle behaviours in the future, [56] a
fresh look at the financing and organisation of preventa-
tive care is urgently required.
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